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ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the Department of Defense (DOD) 
annual audit through analysis of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). 
This study addresses material weaknesses detailed in the FY 2020 DOD Inspector 
General (IG) audit by applying internal control standards to the policies and accounting 
practices of DFAS. The author finds that monitoring and control procedures implemented 
by DFAS do not meet objectives for producing accurate and auditable financial 
information. Analysis of the history of audits, GAO reports, and DOD IG inspections 
reveals patterns of insufficient corrective action that require remediation. Furthermore, 
antiquated IT systems, unclear accounting policies, and misaligned quality assurance 
monitoring programs contributed to numerous FY 2020 material weaknesses. Based on 
major findings, the author makes corrective policy recommendations for the 
consideration of DFAS and DOD leadership. 
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The Department of Defense (DOD) accounts for over half of the government’s 
discretionary spending with an annual budget exceeding $700 billion (United States 
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2021a), yet remains unable to obtain a 
complete audit opinion. The DOD has been designated “high risk” in financial management 
by the GAO since 1995 due to weaknesses in internal controls, policies and procedures, 
and compliance with government standards (GAO, 2020a). As a recent step in a long series 
of efforts to improve auditability, the DOD underwent the third annual agency-wide audit 
in FY 2020. This significant undertaking incurred a cost of $203 million to five 
independent auditing firms, covering $2.7 trillion in assets (Mehta, 2020). The results of 
the FY 2020 audit revealed significant progress in the areas of internal controls, financial 
management systems, and the implementation of updated policy standards when compared 
to the FY 2019 audit (GAO, 2020c). However, the audit committee identified 3559 
Notifications of Findings and Recommendations (NFRs) and 144 material weaknesses 
across the 24 DOD components, many of which were unresolved from the FY 2019 audit 
(Inspector General [IG], 2021b). Seven of the 24 components obtained a clean audit 
opinion, but the DOD is still neither audit ready nor in compliance with the Chief Financial 
Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 (IG, 2021b). This thesis seeks to identify and provide 
recommendations for underlying patterns and inefficiencies that contribute to the continued 
auditability problems faced by the DOD. The methodology of this thesis was to conduct a 
thorough analysis of DFAS internal controls pertaining to the FY 2020 audit via 14 GAO 
reports and 18 IG investigations.  
The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) provides key assistance to 
the DOD regarding financial management and auditability. As a major service provider, 
DFAS offers customer service to the other DOD components in the form of maintaining 
transactions, accounting, and consolidating annual financial reports (DFAS, 2021). In 
addition, DFAS processes 137 million pay transactions for DOD military and civilian 
personnel, manages 12.4 million annual commercial invoices, and maintains 98 million 
General Ledger accounts (DFAS, 2021). Another key responsibility of the organization is 
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preparing the DOD Agency Financial Report (AFR) in conjunction with the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD/Comptroller). The AFR includes the results of the 
annual DOD audit and informs Congress and DOD leadership on the status of the financial 
health of the defense budget (IG, 2021b). When the financial information prepared for the 
AFR is inaccurate or unreliable, decision makers are impacted in their ability to efficiently 
allocate resources when building budgets. Furthermore, Congress and the American people 
lose confidence that the DOD will effectively manage allocated funding. Audit readiness 
is a major priority for the DOD, which expends nearly $1 billion annually correcting 
discrepancies and findings from the agency-wide audit (Mehta, 2020). DFAS plays a key 
role in supporting and implementing these actions to resolve material weaknesses, improve 
accounting standards, and achieve a clean audit opinion.  
The standards for government financial management and internal controls closely 
resemble that of the civilian business industry. The U.S. “Green Book” (Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government) and the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control Integrated 
Framework both include five internal control components and seventeen principles for 
federal agencies and public firms. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-
123 predates the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, which define management 
responsibilities for internal control implementation, monitoring, and reporting. Public 
companies expend great cost and manpower efforts every year to achieve compliance with 
SOX Section 404, which outlines external and internal annual auditing requirements (SOX, 
2020). Best practices and lessons learned from the success of public companies can be 
applied to the FY 2020 audit results as recommendations for DFAS and the DOD to 
improve internal control procedures and reduce the risk of material misstatement.  
This thesis seeks to identify patterns and inefficient internal controls that have led 
to repeat material weaknesses under the purview of DFAS. The DOD is unable to maintain 
a complete and accurate universe of accounting transactions, which is exacerbated by 
unsupported adjustments and unbalanced Fund Balance with Treasure (FBWT) accounts 
(OUSD, 2020a). In addition, improper payments have been a long-standing issue for the 
DOD, totaling $1.7 trillion from 2003 to 2019 (GAO, 2020e). The FY 2020 audit also 
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identified multiple instances of non-compliance with OMB Circular A-123 and the 
Financial Improvement and Audit Remediation (FIAR) plan (2020a). To understand the 
root cause of these issues, this thesis analyzed the history of investigative reports and audits 
conducted by the GAO and DOD IG. These organizations conduct detailed investigations 
into financial management practices and internal controls for the DOD and its components. 
Many of their recommendations remain open for years, and thorough review revealed 
underlying patterns that contributed to the DOD’s inability to obtain a clean audit opinion.  
The history of GAO and IG reports revealed ineffective internal controls and IT 
systems within DFAS and the DOD, which lead to the major findings of this thesis. 
Insufficiently designed accounting policies increased the risk of financial misstatement and 
contributed to eight consecutive years of unreliable AFR data (IG, 2020a). DFAS is non-
compliant with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act, lacking sufficient 
documentation, procedures, and quality assurance programs to identify and resolve 
improper payments (GAO, 2014a). In addition, weaknesses in procedures for balancing 
FBWT and suspense accounts resulted in an unreliable universe of transactions (OUSD, 
2020a) and non-compliance with the FAIR (GAO, 2014a). Legacy financial and 
accounting systems throughout the DOD contributed to over half of all NFRs in the FY 
2020 audit and hindered all corrective action efforts by providing inaccurate and unreliable 
data (IG, 2021b). These findings contributed to ten of the 26 material weakness categories 
outlined in the FY 2020 audit, many of which have corresponding recommendations from 
the GAO and IG that have yet to be fully implemented (OUSD, 2020a). While DFAS has 
made noticeable improvements towards auditability, there are instances of self-reported 
corrective actions that were found insufficient during follow-on investigations (IG, 2020b). 
Analysis of these findings led to four corrective recommendations for DOD and DFAS 
leadership to consider, which may improve efforts towards auditability and reduce future 
risk of material misstatement. The four recommendations drawn from the author’s analysis 
are redesigning control activities on the DFAS user level, leveraging SOX Section 404 best 
practices for monitoring activities, increasing ERP funding with a clearly defined roadmap, 
and updating DOD Directive 5118.05 to better articulate DFAS responsibilities. 
4 
Implementing these recommended actions may result in more efficient and lasting 




II. BACKGROUND  
The audit readiness initiative for the DOD largely began with the Chief Financial 
Officers (CFO) Act of 1990. The act established standards and procedures for federal 
agencies regarding financial management, accounting practices, and auditing (1990). This 
included establishing the CFO position for 24 agencies, requirements for preparing and 
auditing financial statements, and greatly enhancing the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB). The impetus for the CFO Act of 1990 arose from the Federal Managers’ Financial 
Integrity Act of 1982, which identified over 2,200 material weaknesses within executive 
agencies (Brass & Fiorentino, 2020). In addition, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) faced a widespread scandal of fraud, waste, and abuse in 1989 (Ifill, 
1989). To address these concerns, the CFO Act outlined comprehensive financial reform 
and sought to integrate accounting systems across the executive branch (Brass & 
Fiorentino, 2020). In 1994, further legislation required the CFO agencies to prepare 
financial statements covering all accounts, and by 1996 six agencies had achieved 
unmodified audit opinions (Brass & Fiorentino, 2020). In 2021, the DOD remains one of 
only two federal agencies unable to receive an unmodified audit opinion. 
A. TIMELINE 
• The Federal Manager’s Financial Integrity Act of 1982 identified over 
2,200 material internal control weaknesses within executive branch 
agencies (Brass & Fiorentino, 2020). 
• The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 established the CFO position 
within the DOD and outlined standards for financial management and 
auditing (CFO, 1990). 
• The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2002 required the 
DOD IG to conduct only the necessary procedures to audit financial 
statements the DOD deemed audit ready, resulting in years of incomplete 
audits with little focused improvement (IG, 2021b).  
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• The 2010 NDAA required the DOD to develop a Financial Improvement 
and Audit Readiness Plan (FIAR) which would describe the specific 
corrective actions and associated costs to correct financial management 
deficiencies. In addition, the 2010 NDAA required the DOD to provide 
audit ready consolidated financial statements by September 30, 2017 
(GAO, 2014a). 
• The 2014 NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to conduct full-scope 
audits of the DOD beginning FY 2018, which would review consolidated 
financial statements in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) and result in audit opinions (IG, 2021b).  
• The 2016 NDAA required independent external auditors to review the 
nine Office of Management and Budget (OMB) required DOD reporting 
entities (IG, 2021b). 
• The first full-scope annual audit was conducted in FY 2018 by the DOD 
IG and five independent public accounting firms (IG, 2021b). The most 
recent FY 2020 audit of the DOD and its 24 components resulted in nine 
clean audit opinions, one qualified opinion, and 15 disclaimers of opinion 
due to the inability to provide sufficient documentation for a complete 
audit (IG, 2021b).  
B. AUDITING 
To understand why Congress and the DOD have invested billions of dollars into 
passing these audits, it is important to discuss the process of auditing and the significance 
of financial statements. The Government Auditing Standards, known as the “Yellow 
Book,” outline the requirements for conducting audits with integrity, transparency, and 
competence (GAO, 2018). Audits provide decision makers with objective analysis of 
agencies and programs to inform budgets and policy (GAO, 2018). Increased visibility and 
strict guidelines for financial management reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse and 
improve efficiency, integration, and resource allocation (GAO, 2020c). Since the CFO Act 
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of 1990, the GAO assessed that government agencies have made significant improvements 
in leadership, financial reporting, and internal controls (2020c).  
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) defines four types 
of audit opinions that may be issued for an organization: 
• Unmodified Opinion: the auditor has sufficient evidence to conclude that 
“financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects” (2020b, 
AU-C §700.10) 
• Qualified Opinion: the auditor has sufficient evidence to conclude that 
misstatements are “material but not pervasive to the financial statements” 
(2020c, AU-C §705A.08) 
• Adverse Opinion: the auditor has sufficient evidence to conclude that 
misstatements are “both material and pervasive to the financial 
statements” (2020c, AU-C §705A.09) 
• Disclaimer of Opinion: the auditor is “unable to obtain sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence on which to base the opinion, and… that the 
possible effects on the financial statements of undetected misstatements, if 
any, could be both material and pervasive” (2020c, AU-C §705A.10) 
Within the context of audits, the term “material” is defined as misstatements that 
would “influence the judgement made by a reasonable user based on the financial 
statements” (2020a, AU-C §320.02). Therefore, the goal of the DOD is to receive an 
unmodified audit opinion indicating the appropriate use of government resources according 
to accounting standards.  
C. INTERNAL CONTROLS 
The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, known as the “Green 
Book,” defines internal controls as processes “effected by an entity’s oversight body, 
management, and other personnel that provide reasonable assurance that the objectives of 
an entity will be achieved” (2014c, OV1.01). These controls provide the means for the 
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DOD and its components to implement and maintain financial and accounting standards. 
Furthermore, the Green Book provides a framework for government entities to implement 
internal controls in categories covering operations, reporting, and compliance. The five 
major components of internal controls are Control Environment, Risk Assessment, Control 
Activities, Information and Communication, and Monitoring Activities (2014c). These 
components are further broken down into 17 principles (Figure 1), which provide specific 
focus points for improving and implementing standard controls. By following these 
guidelines, government bodies can improve efficiency in business practices and reduce the 
risk of fraud, waste, and abuse (GAO, 2014c). 
 
Figure 1. Principles of Internal Controls. Source: GAO (2014c). 
D. APPLICABLE LEGISLATION 
Additional legislation published by various federal agencies provide further 
amplification on the CFO Act and government standards for auditability and internal 
controls. These regulations provide specific details and guidance that form a framework 
for analyzing and understanding the FY 2020 audit results and plans for corrective action.  
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1. OMB Circular No. A-123 
OMB Circular A-123 defines management’s responsibility for internal control in 
Federal Agencies (OMB, 2016). These requirements include establishing, assessing, 
correcting, and reporting on internal controls. The circular emphasizes the importance of 
integrated, coordinated internal controls for effectively adhering to government standards 
(OMB, 2016). It outlines six actionable requirements for federal program management: 
1. Develop and implement appropriate, cost-effective internal control for 
results-oriented management; 
2. Assess the adequacy of internal control in Federal programs and 
operations; 
3. Separately assess and document internal control over financial reporting 
consistent with the process defined in Appendix A; 
4. Identify needed improvements; 
5. Take corresponding corrective action; and 
6. Report annually on internal control through management assurance 
statements. (OMB, 2016, para. 4) 
The extent to which DFAS and the DOD implement these requirements is analyzed 
in the results of GAO and IG reports, as well as the material weaknesses outlined in the FY 
2020 audit. Multiple components report non-compliance with OMB Circular A-123, and 
DFAS does not adequately meet this standard (OUSD, 2020a).  
2. Financial Improvement and Readiness (FIAR) Directorate 
In 2005, the DOD comptroller established the first Financial Improvement and 
Readiness (FIAR) Directorate to standardize and document DOD efforts to develop more 
effective financial management (Property & Equipment Policy Office, 2021). Each DOD 
component is responsible for providing detailed progress reports on the milestones 
published in the FIAR, which are specific corrective actions designed to promote accurate 
and complete financial reporting (OUSD, 2020b). The key focus areas of the FIAR are 
internal controls, financial information accuracy, and systems improvement. The intent of 
this annual process is to create a uniform, integrated strategy for DOD components to work 
together to achieve audit readiness. The most recent FIAR was released in June 2020, 
which incorporated the results of the FY 2019 audit and DOD corrective action plans 
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(CAPs) (2020b). The FIAR provides a foundation to measure the progress of DFAS and 
the DOD when analyzing the results of audits, reports, and investigations.  
3. Payment Integrity Information Act (PIIA) of 2019 
The Payment Integrity Information Act (PIIA) of 2019 supersedes all previous 
iterations of the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) of 2002, 2010, 
and 2012, as well as the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015. The PIIA did 
not remove any elements from previous versions of the law, only added clarity and 
additional requirements (2020). Since the first IPERA of 2002, the GAO and IG have 
conducted extensive research and investigation into improper payments. Those reports 
provide valuable insight into the related material weaknesses and instances of non-
compliance outlined in the FY 2020 audit.  
The PIIA requires government organizations to identify and review programs at 
high risk of improper payments, which are payments made in error, underpaid, or overpaid 
(IG, 2020b). These payments can result in monetary loss to the government and create risk 
of financial misstatement. The President’s Management Agenda of 2018 listed the 
reduction and correction of improper payments as one of 11 Cross-Agency Priority goals 
(IG, 2020b). Each year the DOD IG releases a status report on DOD compliance with the 
criteria of the PIIA, which are (2020b): 
1. Publishing annual financial statements 
2. Conducting risk assessment for programs 
3. Publishing improper payments estimates 
4. Publishing corrective actions for improper payments 
5. Publishing and meeting reduction targets for improper payments 
6. Meeting a threshold of no more than 10% improper payments 
The most recent 2021 IG investigation found that DFAS complied with four of six 
PIIA requirements for FY 2020, but “published unreliable improper payments estimates” 
and “missed its annual improper payment reduction target” (IG, 2021a).  
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E. DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE 
The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) was created in 1991 to 
“standardize, consolidate, and improve accounting and financial functions throughout the 
Department of Defense” (DFAS, 2020a). DFAS processes pay for all DOD military and 
civilian personnel, handles contractor and commercial invoices, maintains millions of 
general ledger accounts, and manages Foreign Military Sales, Retirement and Health 
Benefit Funds, and DOD appropriations (2020a). In addition, as the DOD component 
service provider, DFAS is responsible for consolidating each agency’s financial 
information to publish the annual DOD Agency Financial Report (AFR) in conjunction 
with the OUSD (Comptroller). DFAS is a Working Capital Fund (WCF) agency, which 
means a goal of “net zero” balancing funding and expenses for performing finance and 
accounting services. The 2020 DFAS operating budget was $1.44 billion, and the DFAS 
WCF has consistently received unmodified audit opinions for the past 21 years (DFAS, 
2020b). 
DFAS plays a major role in the annual DOD audit as the accounting and financial 
service provider (OUSD, 2020a). DFAS is largely responsible for balancing and 
maintaining the universe of financial transactions for all components, standardizing and 
consolidating financial information, and reconciling Fund Balance with Treasury (FBWT) 
accounts with the Department of the Treasury (Treasury). Each of these areas of 
responsibility is identified as a category of material weakness in the FY 2020 audit (OUSD, 
2020a). While the responsibility of auditability is shared across the entire DOD, the internal 
control weaknesses within DFAS inhibit its ability to meet the mission of providing service 
and financial support to the DOD components.  
F. RESULTS OF FY 2020 AUDIT 
The results of the FY 2020 audit for the DOD are published by the OUSD in the 
FY 2020 AFR. The DOD IG, along with independent auditors Cotton & Company, LLP, 
Ernst & Young, LLP, Grant Thornton, LLP, Kearney & Company, P.C, and KPMG, LLP, 
provided over 1,400 auditors to review 76,000 sample items, 36,000 document requests, 
and visit over 100 locations (IG, 2021b). The auditors reissued 2,641 Notifications of 
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Findings and Recommendations (NFRs) from the previous FY 2019 audit and opened 918 
new NFRs. Nine of the 24 DOD components received unmodified audit opinions, one 
received a qualified opinion, and 14 received disclaimers of opinion. In addition, the audit 
identified 144 material weaknesses and 49 instances of non-compliance with U.S. laws and 
regulations across the 24 components. The breakdown of results by reporting entity are 
displayed in Table 1.  
Table 1. Results of FY 2020 DOD Audit. Adapted from IG (2021b).  




Department of the 
Army 
505 General 12 2 
WCF 13 2 
Sub-allotted 2 2 
Department of the 
Navy 
1,160 General 17 2 
WCF 11 2 
Department of the Air 
Force 
521 General 12 2 
WCF 10 2 
Sub-allotted 2 2 
U. S. Marine Corps 151 General 8 4 
U. S. Army Corps of 
Engineers 
57 Civil Works 2 2 
Defense Health 
Program 
155 General 11 4 
Defense Information 
Systems Agency 
69 General 5 3 
WCF 5 3 
Defense Logistics 
Agency 
457 General 7 2 
WCF 7 2 
Transaction 6 2 
Sub-allotted 1 2 
U. S. Special 
Operations Command 
101 General 5 2 
Sub-allotted 1 2 
U. S. Transportation 
Command 
161 WCF 5 2 
Defense Health 
Agency-  
13 Contract Resource 
Management 
0 0 
Sub-allotted 1 2 





10 General 0 0 
Agency-Wide 185 N/A N/A N/A 
Total 3,559  144 50 
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The following 26 categories of material weakness were identified in the FY 2020 
audit, which indicate risk of material misstatement in financial reporting: 
• Legacy systems 
• Configuration management and security management 
• Access controls 
• Segregation of duties 
• Universe of transactions 
• Fund balance with treasury 
• Suspense accounts 
• Inventory and related property 
• Operating samples and supplies 
• General property, plant, and equipment 
• Real property 
• Government property in the possession of contractors 
• Joint strike fighter program 
• Military housing privatization initiative 
• Accounts payable 
• Environmental and disposal liabilities 
• Beginning balances 
• Unsupported accounting adjustments 
• Intradepartmental eliminations and intragovernmental transactions 
• Gross costs 
• Earned revenue 
• Budgetary resources 
• Service providers 
• Entity-level controls 
• DOD-wide oversight and monitoring 
• Component-level oversight and monitoring. (OUSD, 2020a) 
In order to improve compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act (PIIA) 
of 2019, the FY 2020 AFR lists detailed information about improper payments, 
summarized in Table 2 (OUSD, 2020a). This data is reported by DOD components through 
DFAS and subject to error, as reported in investigations by both the GAO and DOD IG.  
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Table 2. Improper Payments Report FY 2020. Adapted from OUSD 
(2020a). 





Military Health Benefits $338.88  $17.05 5.16% 
Military Pay – Army $3,556.3 $3,827.47 79.5% 
Military Pay – Navy $51.41 $27.50 53.49% 
Military Pay – Air Force $1,568.79 $1,170.85 74.63% 
Military Pay – Marine 
Corps 
$0.19  $0.0 0% 
Civilian Pay $4,915.83 $4,911.19 99.9% 
Military Retirement $352.49 $4.08 1.16% 
DOD Travel Pay $314.87 $68.67 21.8% 
Commercial Pay $306.65 $0.0 0% 
USACE Travel Pay $0.8 $0.0 0% 
SACE Commercial Pay $0.0 $0.0 0% 
Total $11,406.21 $9,026.81 79.14% 
 
G. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
One of the largest accounting scandals in American history involved the fraudulent 
practices of the energy company Enron Corporation. Through deceptive accounting 
practices and joint corruption with the Arthur Andersen accounting firm, executives 
artificially inflated the value of the company and pocketed investment profits. Along with 
other accounting scandals at the time, this factored into the establishment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 (Bondarenko, 2019). The federal law set requirements for 
company boards and management regarding accounting practices, responsibilities, 
auditing, and criminal penalties. Sarbanes-Oxley amplified and standardized requirements 
for financial statement disclosures and increased accountability for corporate fraud. In 
addition, the act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
which governs the auditing of public companies through publishing standard policies 
(SOX, 2020).  
Section 404 of SOX requires public companies to conduct top-down risk 
assessment of internal controls. Due to the strict requirements and intensive senior 
management involvement, it is considered the most costly and difficult element of the SOX 
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Act. A 2007 study by Financial Executives International (FEI) found that costs of 
compliance ranged from .03%-.05% of revenue, and only 22% of companies believed the 
benefits of SOX section 404 outweighed the costs (2007). To reduce the burden on smaller 
companies ($75-$250 million public float), the SEC released additional guidance in 2007 
and 2009 (SEC, 2011). With relaxed requirements for new companies and updated 
clarification from the SEC, PCAOB, and COSO Internal Control Framework, the 2011 
SEC study found costs of section 404 had declined, more investors viewed internal control 
reporting favorably, and that financial reporting had increased in accuracy for public 
companies (2011). A 2012 study by Arping and Sautner (2012)compared cross-listed and 
non-cross-listed companies and found that SOX increased transparency in reporting 
financial data which resulted in more accurate earnings forecasts, stock evaluations, and 
company reliability.  
The Protiviti 2016 Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance Survey found that two thirds of 
companies have seen significant improvements in internal controls as a result of SOX 
compliance (Protiviti, 2016). The release of the updated 2013 Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control Integrated 
Framework saw a short duration increase to cost and manpower requirements, but as 
companies entered their third or more year of compliance over 70% saw costs decrease by 
10% annually. The time requirements for compliance are still evident, as large companies 
average 7.5 hours a year testing each internal control through management review 
processes (Protiviti, 2016). In recent years, automation has improved standardization, time 
requirements, and overall efficiency of internal controls for public organizations. The most 
recent 2020 Protiviti study includes best practices compiled from 735 different 
organizations regarding monitoring activities, control procedures, and IT systems 
(Protiviti, 2020). Appendix A lists examples applicable to the DOD and DFAS.  
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III. FINDINGS  
The FY 2020 DOD audit identified 26 categories of material weakness, ranging 
from oversight and monitoring to the F-35 program (OUSD, 2020a). For the purposes of 
this thesis, the author investigated material weaknesses related to DFAS, accounting, and 
internal controls. Trends and patterns in data and historical reports revealed inefficiencies 
in internal controls related to the findings of the FY 2020 audit. These findings discuss 
those trends and potential root causes of material weaknesses and non-compliance faced 
by the DOD and DFAS.  
A. IMPROPER PAYMENTS 
Improper payments were one material weakness category reported in the FY 2020 
audit, and the DOD was found non-compliant with the Payment Integrity Information Act 
of 2019 (2020a). The FY 2020 AFR listed $660.32 billion in DOD contract payments 
subject to the PIIA, of which $11.41 billion were reported as improper. This data 
represented a total reduction of $2.27 billion in improper payments from FY 2019 and 
consisted of 1.73% of all transactions. However, DFAS has a history of reporting 
inaccurate improper payments data, a key reason why they remain a source of investigation 
and material weakness. When these payments are not accurately captured or reported, 
appropriate corrective action to address root cause issues cannot be taken. In addition, 
improper payments can result in financial loss to the government, as 37% of Defense Travel 
System FY 2017 improper payments resulted in monetary loss totaling $205 million (GAO, 
2019). The most recent report by the IG regarding improper payments states that the data 
reported by DFAS has been unreliable for at least eight consecutive years (IG, 2020b), and 
the underlying internal control failures date back to the initial implementation of the 
Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (GAO, 2002).  
Following the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, GAO (2009) and IG 
(2008) investigations revealed DFAS was unable to accurately capture, report, or correct 
improper payments. DFAS suspended its Internal Review recovery audit (GAO, 2009), did 
not have sufficient procedures to investigate improper payments, and did not document 
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contract resolution (IG, 2008). Both reports identified sampling procedures, risk 
assessment, and insufficient internal controls as contributing factors. The IG found that 
$1.4 billion in contract refunds from FYs 2005 and 2006 were not adequately researched 
(2008), and the GAO found that $20.5 billion in commercial payments were not audited or 
assessed (2009).  
In 2015, the DOD IG released a report investigating improper payments for the FY 
2013 AFR (2015b). The IG found that DFAS did not employ accurate testing measures to 
identify improper payments, largely due to a lack of guidance from OMB. Without a 
systematic method that comprehensively considered all payments, DFAS could neither 
pinpoint underlying weaknesses that caused improper payments nor take proper action to 
correct or prevent future errors. The improper payment data in the FY 2013 AFR was 
deemed unreliable, and DFAS was found non-compliant with existing legislation.  
Between 2015 and 2020, the IG and GAO released over 10 reports pertaining to 
improper payments in various DOD programs. The common themes across all reports were 
improper sampling plans, inadequate quality assurance review, lack of documentation and 
procedural guidance, and a lack of published corrective action plans (IG, 2020b). Appendix 
B provides further detail on reports not discussed in the body of this thesis. In 2016, the IG 
began conducting annual payment integrity compliance investigations, the results of which 
are displayed in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Annual IG Investigation Results. Source: OUSD (2020a). 
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DOD compliance with the PIIA has improved annually but the same patterns of 
ineffective internal controls and procedures, insufficient monitoring activities, and lack of 
risk assessment persist. The 2018 DOD IG investigation into the Commercial Pay program 
identified $5.7 billion in improper payments missed by the sampling plan, and an additional 
$1 billion misreported by DFAS Enterprise Solutions and Standards (ESS) personnel 
(2018b). The sampling plan was poorly designed, search criteria were not validated, and 
risk assessment was insufficient (IG, 2018b). The 2020 DOD IG investigation into the 
Mechanization of Contract Administration Services system (MOCAS), revealed similar 
root cause issues. DFAS failed to identify $136 million in improper payments, including 
$25.8 million reviewed by the quality assurance Post-Pay Review team (IG, 2020a). The 
sampling process remained flawed, utilizing paid invoice data instead of actual 
disbursement amounts. Reviews were not conducted for vouchers, duplicate payments, or 
recoupment amounts, and 464 underpayments were reported through the DFAS Contract 
Debt System (DCDS) instead of the AFR. Over 30 IG recommendations remain open 
regarding improper payments according to the 2020 compendium (IG, 2020c). While 
DFAS has reported corrective action plans for most open recommendations, the IG has 
previously identified instances of insufficient remediation. The GAO, IG, and external 
audits document a pattern of ineffective internal controls, inadequate data sampling 
processes, a lack of management oversight and training, and substandard quality assurance 
verification (IG, 2020a).  
B. UNIVERSE OF TRANSACTIONS 
The FY 2020 audit identified the universe of transactions as another category of 
material weakness that increased the risk of material misstatement (OUSD, 2020a). The 
universe of transactions is “the entirety of underlying, individual, accounting transactions 
that support a financial statement line or balance” (OUSD, 2020b, p. 35). To reconcile the 
budget with financial statements, DFAS and the DOD components perform balance 
comparisons with transaction data for the fiscal year. Current system limitations often 
require those reconciliations to occur on a summary level vice transaction level, which fails 
to properly document the underlying financial information for the transaction (OUSD, 
2020a). OMB Bulletin No. 19–03 requires the universe of transactions the reconcile with 
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underlying transaction-level detail (OMB, 2019), since summary level data does not 
provide the necessary information to support adjustments for balance differences. An 
incomplete universe of transactions negatively impacts the DOD’s ability to balance 
accounts and accurately prepare financial statements (OUSD, 2020a). Other categories of 
material weakness contributed to the DOD’s inaccurate universe of transactions and have 
been the subject of extensive GAO and DOD IG investigation. Review of these historical 
reports provided insight into ineffective policies and controls resulting in inaccurate 
financial data.  
1. Unsupported Accounting Adjustments  
Unsupported accounting adjustments were a material weakness identified in the FY 
2020 audit that resulted in increased risk of financial misstatement. Forced-balance journal 
entries are implemented by DFAS when prepared financial documents for DOD accounts 
do not match the Treasury balances (GAO, 2020a). These “plugs” replace submitted 
financial statements and have been identified as a material weakness in every annual DOD 
audit. Furthermore, they contributed significantly to the DOD’s inability to maintain an 
accurate universe of transactions (IG, 2021b). During the last two quarters of FY 2020 
DFAS conducted 1,900 adjustments, exceeding $293 billion, without sufficient 
documentation (OUSD, 2020a). The GAO investigated financial data from FY 2018 and 
found that over 180,000 adjustments lacked supporting documentation in the fourth quarter 
alone (GAO, 2020a). This investigation found that DFAS control activities were 
insufficient and inconsistent, lacked root-cause analysis, and resulted in substantial risk of 
material misstatement in financial reports. DFAS acknowledged the lack of procedures 
governing root cause analysis but stated that they “do not have any plans to modify the 
current financial management environment to eliminate the recording of these types of 
adjustments” (GAO, 2020a, p. 13) until the implementation of enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) systems in 2025. There is no documented evidence that existing internal controls 
are properly followed, and the GAO found that the periodic random samples conducted by 
DFAS are insufficient (2020a). In addition, DFAS does not have adequate guidance 
defining what entails supporting documentation for accounting adjustments. These 
practices contributed to the DOD’s inability to maintain an accurate and complete universe 
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of transactions and resulted in unreliable financial data reported in the AFR. None of the 
GAO recommendations to correct these issues have been fully implemented (GAO, 2020a).  
2. Fund Balance with Treasury  
The FY 2020 audit identified the Fund Balance with Treasury (FBWT) as another 
material weakness that impacted the universe of transactions and indicated risk of financial 
misstatement (OUSD, 2020a). FBWT accounts contain cash balances for government 
agency spending. Hundreds of these accounts are maintain by the Treasury and must be 
balanced with annual financial reports (IG, 2021b). Discrepancies between the Treasury 
balance and individual DOD components have been a recurring material weakness 
identified in the three annual audits, as well as many IG and GAO reports.  
The IG investigated the FY 2014 Department of the Navy (DON) FBWT 
reconciliation process and identified $226 million of unresolved differences in the first 
quarter alone (2015a). The IG concluded that the inability to resolve differences was 
largely due to a lack of supporting transaction data for the FBWT balances. The DON used 
Program Budget Information System (PBIS) and Defense Cash Accountability System 
(DCAS) data instead of general accounting ledgers, preventing DFAS from maintaining an 
accurate universe of transactions. Furthermore, DFAS did not implement required controls 
for the FBWT reconciliation process. The IG recommendations to utilize accounting 
ledgers, review DCAS and PBIS for control weaknesses, and implement standard 
procedures for the FBWT process have not been closed (2015a). Overall, the IG report 
revealed that insufficient control procedures and unreliable data resulted in increased risk 
of material misstatement.  
In 2017, the IG investigated the FY 2016 Army Reserve Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) FBWT reconciliation process with DFAS. This report identified that 
7,789 of 11,359 differences were not resolved within the required 60 days (2017b). DFAS 
did not design control activities to identify and investigate these differences in a timely 
manner and instead utilized unsupported accounting adjustments. These problems were 
exacerbated by a lack of standardized financial systems in the Army. Legacy system 
deficiencies impacted disbursements and transaction processing, preventing DFAS from 
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receiving sufficient data to investigate differences. The IG reviewed the relatively small 
O&M fund’s $5.7 million in adjustments to gain insight into the larger $1.9 billion of 
adjustments conducted for the Army general fund. Overall, the IG found DFAS practices 
were not in accordance with financial regulation and increased the risk of material 
misstatement. Three recommendations from the report specifically addressed the FBWT 
reconciliation process and Army accounting systems, none of which have been closed 
(2017b).  
The FY 2020 audit revealed some improvements by DFAS in support of developing 
complete and accurate FBWT reconciliations (IG, 2021b). DFAS reduced $250 million of 
undistributed funds for the Army’s account balance and resolved 98% of statement 
differences for the Defense Information System Agency (DISA). However, DFAS stated 
that the organization had exhausted all possible efforts to accurately clear aged FBWT 
transactions. $1 billion in transactions were cleared by transferring unsupported amounts 
to accounts that had available funds. This included 18,824 transactions totaling $404.20 
million placed in an expired DOD O&M fund without knowledge of the purpose of those 
funds (IG, 2021b). The DOD reported 2022 as the target year for remediation of the FBWT 
material weakness but has not provided a clear and actionable plan to do so. Discrepancies 
in FBWT accounts contributed to the incomplete universe of transactions and were 
primarily caused by insufficient internal controls and legacy financial systems (OUSD, 
2020a).  
3. Suspense Accounts 
The FY 2020 audit identified suspense accounts as another category of material 
weakness that negatively impacted the universe of transactions (OUSD, 2020a). Suspense 
accounts are “accounts used to temporarily hold transactions that belong to the Government 
while waiting for information that will allow the transactions to be matched to a specific 
receipt or expenditure account” (OUSD, 2020a, p. 86). According to the audit findings, 
DFAS was unable to adequately monitor, research, or clear funds from these accounts. 
Many of these accounts are shared by multiple DOD components, further complicating the 
process (OUSD, 2020a). DFAS control activities do not sufficiently reduce the risk of 
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material misstatement in suspense accounts, a common pattern investigated by the GAO 
and IG.  
The 2016 IG investigation into the Department of the Army suspense account 
revealed inadequate internal controls and procedures (2016c). The IG identified financial 
misstatements totaling $189.87 million in FY 2014 and $223.70 million in FY 2015 
(2016c). DFAS did not perform historical data analysis to determine what portion of the 
accounts correlated to Army financial statements. $173.1 million in the Army suspense 
account were unsupported transactions or accounting adjustments. DFAS did not verify 
accounting activities or clear suspense account transactions within the required 60 days. 
Two of the IG recommendations to establish additional accounts and adjust regulations 
regarding account usage remain open (2016c). 
The 2016 IG investigation into the Department of the Air Force suspense account 
revealed similar practices resulting in increased risk of material misstatement (2016d). 
DFAS did not analyze historical data to accurately correlate balances between financial 
statements. Additionally, DFAS personnel did not research or clear suspense transactions 
within 60 days due to a lack of standard procedures (IG, 2016d). Unsupported accounting 
entries were used to manually correct balances which resulted in financial misstatements 
totaling $22.7 million and $7.6 million in FY 2014 and FY 2015, respectively (IG, 2016d). 
Incorrect use of suspense accounts for the Thrift Savings Plan and payroll tax withholding 
resulted in overstatements exceeding $400 million in both FY 2014 and 2015. Two of the 
IG recommendations to revise federal regulation and establish proper suspense accounts 
remain open.  
More recently, the 2021 GAO investigation into DFAS suspense account practices 
revealed the same consistent patterns of ineffective internal controls (GAO, 2021b). DFAS 
still lacked sufficient documentation and procedures to clear suspense account transactions. 
$366 million out of $1.6 billion outstanding funds were more than 30 days old, and over 
half of all transactions were over 60 days old (GAO, 2021b). DFAS initiatives to clear 
transactions focused on reducing numbers and lacked root cause analysis. The lack of a 
complete DOD universe of transactions made accurate correlation of funds nearly 
impossible, and corrective actions related to suspense account initiatives had not 
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materialized. Suspense accounts still held invalid transactions from revenue, payroll, and 
taxes. While some existing procedures for reconciling suspense accounts exist, they are 
outdated and inconsistently followed. Specifically, policies failed to define the appropriate 
use of suspense accounts and outline the correct procedures to clear balances. Recent 
initiatives to correct deficiencies through the creation of working groups fell short of 
identifying root causes, developing response plans, or documenting progress (GAO, 
2021b). All eight recommendations to correct these findings remain open.  
C. INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Legacy information systems were a key material weakness identified in the FY 
2020 audit (OUSD, 2020a). The DOD reported over 250 systems relevant to financial 
management, 30 of which were identified as legacy systems, or those “scheduled for 
retirement within 36 months” (OUSD, 2020a, p. 83). The audit team found legacy systems 
inconsistently categorized, several instances of non-compliance with the Federal Financial 
Management Improvement Act (FFMIA), and no comprehensive plan to update systems 
in a timely manner. Information technology problems have plagued DOD financial 
management for years, and over 1,400 outstanding NFRs remain open since the first full 
DOD audit (IG, 2021b). The hundreds of financial systems employed by the various DOD 
components do not provide transaction level accounting detail, do not integrate with each 
other, and often do not comply with regulations. The DOD missed target goals for 
improving IT material weaknesses by over 50% between FY 2019 and FY 2020 and 
acknowledged the significant level of effort still required to correct these issues (IG, 
2021b).  
The 2020 GAO study on information systems found that the DOD lacked a clear 
and comprehensive plan to implement enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems across 
its components (2020d). In response to the FY 2019 audit, OMB directed the DOD to 
define the current state of IT systems and develop a plan to transition to an integrated, 
effective system environment (GAO, 2020d). The GAO found that the DOD did not have 
detailed plans for migrating individual accounting systems, lacked performance goals and 
milestones, and could not calculate the cost of supporting current financial systems. The 
25 
GAO assessed that these systems generated a minimum of $2.8 billion in annual operations 
and maintenance costs, which did not include 45 systems the DOD failed to include in the 
list provided. Based on the report, the DOD remained at high risk for information systems 
related material weakness while incurring high short-term maintenance costs (2020d).  
The goal of an integrated, effective DOD ERP system has been slowly gaining 
ground for many years, although not without delays and significant financial loss. The 2012 
GAO study on Army and Air Force ERP systems highlighted the key role they would plan 
in achieving auditability by 2017 (GAO, 2014b). At that time, the GAO found that 
acquisition controls failed to deliver the required capabilities on time or within the original 
budget (2014b). The Army’s General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) and the 
Air Force’s Defense Enterprise and Accounting Management System (DEAMS) did not 
meet minimum accounting standards for data receipt, invoicing, or reporting accounts 
receivable. The system employment was delayed by the DOD due to major system 
weaknesses, and the training plan for DFAS personnel did not provide adequate skillsets 
to effectively operate the systems (GAO, 2014b). The five recommendations provided by 
the GAO to address these issues were closed without implementation, which provided 
insight on the current material weaknesses and NFRs identified in the FY 2020 audit.  
Recent initiatives to deploy ERP systems for the major DOD components have 
encountered significantly more success. The Army GFEBS system successfully completed 
a cloud migration in July of 2020 (Brading, 2020) and considered fully deployed by the 
DOD (OUSD, 2020a). Furthermore, the 2019 IG follow-up audit on GFEBS revealed that 
the Army had successfully implemented some of the recommendations from previous 
audits in 2013 (IG, 2019b). Only one corrective recommendation from the 2019 IG audit 
remained open in the March 2020 IG compendium, which demonstrated active progress by 
the Army regarding GFEBS. The Army has also deployed the Logistics Modernization 
Program (LMP) and Global Combat Support System – Army (GCSS-A) to leverage 
integrated ERP for supply and acquisition (OUSD, 2020a). Likewise, the Navy and Air 
Force are in various stages of deploying and integrating ERP systems. Navy ERP is a fully 
deployed financial accounting system overseeing half of the organization’s obligation 
activity. The Navy recently awarded an $850 million contract to IBM for wholistic 
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technical support of their ERP system (Edwards, 2021). The Air Force is still in the process 
of deploying DEAMS and the Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay Systems (AF-IPPS) 
and does not have an active fully serviceable ERP system (OUSD, 2020a). Lastly, the 
Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI) is another partially deployed ERP financial system for 
many other components and services within the DOD, including DFAS. DAI is to be a 
fully integrated budget, finance, and accounting system that will automate controls and 
provide reliable, accurate information for the DOD (Defense Logistics Agency, 2021). The 
target year for fully deploying and integrating these systems is FY 2028, but the recent 
GAO study found that the DOD did not have a clearly defined path to attain that goal 
(2020d). 
D. SERVICE PROVIDERS 
The FY 2020 audit identified service providers as a broad material weakness 
category related to internal controls and financial statements (OUSD, 2020a). As the 
financial and accounting service provider for the DOD, DFAS is largely responsible for 
consolidating and producing accurate financial statements. (IG, 2021b). DOD Directive 
5118.05 states that DFAS shall “direct and oversee finance and accounting requirements,” 
“establish and enforce requirements, principles, standards, procedures, processes, and 
practices necessary to comply with finance and accounting statutory and regulatory 
requirements,” and “provide finance and accounting services for the other DOD 
components” (DOD, 2020, p. 2). This guidance indicates that DFAS is fully responsible 
for all financial activity within the DOD, and consequently most of the corrective action 
resulting from the annual audit. However, 13 open IG recommendations were transferred 
from DFAS to the OUSD (Comptroller) (IG, 2020c). DODD 5118.05 states that DFAS 
shall “provide advice and recommendations to the USD(C)/CFO on finance and accounting 
matters” (DOD, 2020, p. 2), which creates confusion as to where the responsibility for 
corrective action lies. The FY 2020 audit indicates that internal control deficiencies within 
DFAS, along with unclear responsibility, increased the risk of financial misstatement 
(OUSD, 2020a).  
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In 2014, the GAO conducted a study on the DFAS contract pay Financial 
Improvement Plan (FIP) (2014a). The Financial Improvement and Readiness (FIAR) 
Directorate required DFAS to generate a plan to test its internal controls and processes for 
contract pay, which covers disbursements approximating $200 billion annually. At the 
time, DFAS self-reported full compliance with the FIAR and “asserted audit readiness” 
(GAO, 2014a p. 1). The GAO investigation found that DFAS met none of the guidelines 
outlined in the FIAR, and that the contract pay FIP could not reliably be used by DOD 
components. The original FIP written by DFAS excluded reporting to the Treasury, 
reconciling disbursements to general ledgers, and closing the contract (GAO, 2014a). 
Additionally, DFAS identified and self-reported the correction of 399 deficiencies related 
to internal controls and IT processes. The GAO found that DFAS did not adequately 
address any of the deficiencies, and their review process most likely missed many more. 
DFAS did not perform adequate planning activities, risk assessment, data reconciliation, 
or the necessary testing of internal controls. Consequently, DFAS was found to be at risk 
for financial misstatement regarding contract pay. Of the nine GAO recommendations 
regarding documentation, internal controls, and testing, five were closed without 
implementation (GAO, 2014a). This report provided cautionary insight into the accuracy 
of self-reporting and the need for external verification of corrective action. 
The FY 2020 audit demonstrated that DFAS had taken significant steps to address 
material weaknesses and NFRs since 2019 (OUSD, 2020a). DFAS implemented a project 
to reconcile FBWT differences, reducing the amount from $6.6 billion to $821 million in 
the last two years. Those differences amounted to .25% of the 2019 FBWT, and the DOD 
is seeking to downgrade the material weakness in the FY 2021 audit. DFAS shared the 
results of their data analysis with the DOD components to improve ownership of the 
process, and the quarterly transaction detail report was deemed auditable for the previous 
two years (OUSD, 2020a). In addition, improvements to internal controls resulted in a 78% 
reduction of unsupported journal vouchers for a total dollar amount reduction of 63%. 
Lastly, DFAS reduced transaction disparities from FY 2019 financial statements by $29.4 
billion by clearing offsetting data and developing a sustainable base of individual 
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accounting lines for future fiscal years (OUSD, 2020a). However, DFAS still generated 
misstated financial reports in the FY 2020 AFR.  
DFAS does manage their own WCF well. Each year they are audited by Williams 
Adley & Company of Washington, D.C., and have received 21 consecutive unmodified 
opinions (DFAS, 2020b). The WCF consists of $1.44 billion as an operating budget for 
DFAS. This fund was one of seven to receive a clean audit opinion in the FY 2020 audit, 
indicating that DFAS has a structure in place to accurate and effectively manage accounts 
(OUSD, 2020a). The WCF is smaller than most other funds managed by DFAS and largely 
consists of pay and O&M costs for personnel but could provide lessons learned and best 
practices applicable to other accounts and funds. In addition, the 2020 IG investigation into 
the DFAS Internal Review (IR) audit organization found they met internal control 
standards and complied with applicable regulation (IG, 2020d). Over a three-year period, 
the IR organization conducted 52 audits and attestation engagements designed to 
implement quality control within DFAS. The IR team consists of 62 personnel in the three 
DFAS offices, and they received a passing rating from the IG (IG, 2020d). Based on the 
IG report, they did not investigate material weaknesses or major findings identified in the 





The material weaknesses identified in the FY 2020 audit, as well as the findings of 
multiple GAO and IG investigations, revealed patterns of internal control weaknesses 
within DFAS and the DOD. This chapter analyzes the findings compiled from various 
sources and highlights common threads that may be addressed by specific policy 
recommendations.  
A. CONTROL ACTIVITIES 
Control activities are the “policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms that 
enforce management’s directives to achieve the entity’s objectives and address related 
risks” (GAO, 2014c, 10.02). As evidenced by the FY 2020 audit results, the accounting 
practices and procedures employed by DFAS personnel are not effective at producing 
accurate financial information or reducing the risk of material misstatement. The poorly 
defined use of forced balance adjustments resulted in an unreliable universe of transactions, 
demonstrated by FBWT and suspense account discrepancies. Likewise, improper payment 
reporting and reconciliation procedures were not sufficient for reducing risk, identifying 
root cause problems, or preventing financial loss to the government. Almost all audit 
material weaknesses identify insufficient policies and documentation as a root cause, as do 
the applicable GAO and IG reports. In response, the DOD and DFAS have identified 
corrective actions to improve current procedures or implement new ones as needed. These 
corrective actions have been listed for years but have not been followed through to the 
extent necessary to meet auditing and financial management standards. Without sufficient 
control activities that clearly outline the procedures necessary to obtain audit readiness 
when managing accounts and preparing financial statements, DFAS cannot make 
substantial progress. While other corrective measures are also important, improving the 
control policies that contributed to material weaknesses must be a high priority for DFAS 
and the DOD.  
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B. MONITORING ACTIVITIES 
The Standards for Internal Control require management to “establish and operate 
monitoring activities” (GAO, 2014c, 16.01) to define a baseline for evaluation, 
continuously monitor control activities, and evaluate the results of internal review. As 
evidenced by the FY 2020 audit results, existing monitoring efforts within DFAS do not 
effective reduce the risk of material misstatement. The Post-Pay Review team missed 100% 
of improper payments assessed by the IG (2020a), and the existing Internal Review (IR) 
Audit organization did not address controls contributing to $300 billion in unsupported 
accounting adjustments (OUSD, 2020a). The IR organization conducted 52 audits and 
attestations in the past three years, which were assessed as effective by the IG (2020d). 
Management oversight and quality assurance remain material weaknesses within DFAS 
that contributed to the results of the annual audit. Furthermore, DFAS frequently self-
reports corrective action and compliance which is later revealed to be insufficient. Many 
GAO and IG recommendations have remained open for years, including those that would 
directly address existing material weaknesses. DFAS does not adequately monitor control 
activities to the standard outlined in OMB Circular 123-A, which contributed to billions of 
unsupported transactions and improper payments and millions in financial misstatement or 
loss.  
C. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS 
Information technology systems should be utilized to draw “relevant data from 
reliable sources” (GAO, 2014c, 13.01) and produce quality information. The myriad of 
legacy and independent financial systems within the DOD prevented effective financial 
reporting and largely contributed to material weaknesses identified in the FY 2020 audit 
(OUSD, 2020a). 1,400 of the existing NFRs deal directly with DOD IT systems, and annual 
operational and maintenance costs exceeded $2.8 billion (GAO, 2020d). The lack of a 
comprehensive and integrated DOD ERP system negatively impacted DFAS’s ability to 
employ effective internal controls and contributed to long timelines for corrective action. 
Insufficiently designed IT systems contributed to material weaknesses in the universe of 
transactions, balance accounts, and improper payments. Many DOD components reported 
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transactions on the summary level vice detail level, which prevented DFAS personnel from 
reconciling differences. While progress has been made to deploy ERP systems for finance, 
supply, and acquisition within the DOD components, the GAO found no comprehensive 
plan to adequately implement corrective action plans and meet auditability standards 
(GAO, 2021c). Until the DOD can identify a complete list of existing systems and develop 
a plan to effectively deploy ERP systems, sufficient corrective action cannot be taken to 
address material weaknesses and NFRs identified in the FY 2020 audit.  
D. RESPONSIBILITY 
Organizational responsibility has a key role in the effectiveness of DOD and DFAS 
plans for auditability. The FY 2020 IG compendium identified 17 open recommendations 
from seven reports for DFAS, and 13 instances where responsibility was transferred to a 
different organization. The GAO does not maintain such a database, but research identified 
13 reports with unresolved recommendations pertaining to DFAS and DOD auditability. 
The GAO also found that the corrective action plans developed by various DOD 
components lack critical data, root cause analysis, and sufficient documentation (2020b). 
DFAS does not have the personnel or resources to address all 144 material weaknesses and 
3,559 NFRs resulting from the previous three annual audits, but the scope of their 
responsibility is not well defined. This is due to the broad language in DOD Directive 
5118.05, which defines the mission, responsibilities, functions, authorities, and 
administration of DFAS (DOD, 2020). The directive tasks DFAS with overseeing all 
finance and accounting procedures and requirements, establishing and enforcing principles 
and standards to comply with all applicable regulatory requirements, and providing finance 
and accounting services to all other DOD components (2020). DFAS is also responsible 
for advising the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) on all finance and accounting 
matters. The IG recommendations transferred from DFAS to the OUSD highlighted the 
lack of clearly defined responsibility between the two organizations. The language in 
DODD 5118.05 implies that DFAS is largely responsible for correcting all material 
weaknesses and achieving auditability for the DOD but does not provide the requisite tools 
and resources for DFAS to accomplish such a massive undertaking. Therefore, there is no 
clear existing delineation of responsibility regarding corrective action, and as a result many 
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material weaknesses were not sufficiently addressed. This lack of responsibility and 
accountability will continue to result in small, short term fixes instead of wholistic root-







This thesis provides policy recommendations for DFAS and DOD leadership to 
consider. Applying additional resources and funding to auditability corrective actions may 
be difficult due to budget constraints but could result in reduced long term costs. Lessons 
learned and best practices from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provide additional opportunities 
for improvement to existing corrective action efforts. The DOD spends nearly $1 billion 
annually to address the findings of the IG audit, which has resulted in partial progress 
towards achieving a clean audit opinion. To improve upon existing efforts, these 
recommendations focus on root cause issues pertaining to multiple material weaknesses 
that will continue to prevent auditability until adequately corrected.  
A. REDESIGN CONTROL ACTIVITIES 
The author recommends that DFAS redesign control activities by publishing new 
guidance for improper payments, accounting practices, and compiling financial data. This 
includes a comprehensive overhaul of internal controls for sampling procedures, balancing 
FBWT accounts, managing suspense accounts, and maintaining the DOD universe of 
transactions. The existing guidance does not adequately provide DFAS personnel with 
adequate procedures to prevent misstatements, a finding consistent to IG, GAO, and 
independent auditor reports. In addition to updating policy, the author recommends a 
standardized training plan for DFAS team members. Where existing policy is sufficient, 
DFAS employees have not successfully implemented guidance due to a lack of training or 
understanding of procedures. A training plan to provide clear and uniform instruction on 
how to manage transactions, data reconciliation, and reporting will reduce the risk of 
manual error. DFAS responses to the FY 2020 audit and recent IG and GAO reports 
outlined corrective action plans that included improving control procedures and training. 
As audit costs exceed $1 billion annually, it is recommended that DFAS devote attention 
and resources to implementing these actions in an efficient and timely manner. By 
implementing adequate control activities, DFAS can directly address five of the major 
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material weaknesses from the FY 2020 audit, steadily resolve NFRs, and reduce audit costs 
on an annual basis.  
B. LEVERAGE SOX SECTION 404 BEST PRACTICES 
The author recommends that DFAS leverage Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Section 404 
best practices to improve monitoring activities. Management within SOX compliant 
companies spent an average of 7.5 hours assessing and reviewing each internal control on 
an annual basis (Protiviti, 2016). In addition, senior management was responsible for 
personally verifying financial statements and internal control effectiveness (SOX, 2020). 
The 2020 Protiviti survey of 735 SOX compliant companies provided options for DFAS 
leadership to consider when assessing internal controls (2020). In FY 2020, 70% of 
companies used an internal audit review team, and 68% of companies conducted additional 
management reviews of internal controls (Protiviti, 2020). The author recommends DFAS 
utilize the existing IR audit organization to review material weaknesses identified by the 
FY 2020 audit and recent GAO and IG reports. In addition, DFAS management could 
consider personally reviewing internal controls and measuring the effectiveness against an 
established baseline to verify corrective actions. Long term recommendations for reducing 
costs and improving efficiency for monitoring activities include leveraging automated ERP 
tools for workflow, financial processes, and journal entries (Protiviti, 2020). Collaborative 
tools and process workflow checklists with digital signing procedures would improve 
visibility and ease of oversight for management. This recommendation directly addresses 
one material weakness from the FY 2020 audit but would increase the effectiveness of 
corrective action efforts for multiple others. Additional management responsibility requires 
a short-term increase of allocated resources. However, long term results from civilian 
companies demonstrated decreased costs, improved efficiency, and overall enhanced 
control procedures and activities.  
C. INCREASE ERP SYSTEM FUNDING 
To address material weaknesses related to information technology systems, the 
author recommends increased funding for DOD ERP systems. Inadequate accounting and 
financial systems are the largest and most significant hurdle preventing DOD auditability, 
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and caused over half the outstanding audit NFRs. Without effective IT systems, corrective 
action plans for control activities, management oversight, and accounting practices will not 
be fully successful. System sustainment costs exceed $2.8 billion annually, which presents 
the opportunity for long term cost saving through short term investment. The corrective 
target year in the FY 2020 AFR is 2028 (2020a), but the DOD does not have a sufficiently 
detailed and actionable roadmap to achieve this goal (GAO, 2021c). Fully deploying ERP 
systems is directly tied to the timeline for auditability, and the author recommends the 
DOD aggressively pursue a closer target date of 2026. The DOD could reduce overall audit 
and IT maintenance costs by applying available resources and additional funding to a 
comprehensive contract for ERP deployment in the next five years. In addition, the DOD 
could break the pattern of short-term fixes that do not sufficiently address material 
weaknesses and the risk of financial misstatement. To improve IT management and control, 
the DOD should consider a commercial framework such as Control Objectives for 
Information and Related Technology (COBIT). COBIT is an internal control framework 
that allows management to review and minimize technical issues, reduce risk, and establish 
control activities (Information Systems Audit and Control Association, 2021). Many 
companies utilize COBIT to reduce the costs of SOX compliance, and the DOD could 
benefit from a modernized, integrated framework while deploying ERP systems. This 
recommendation addresses three material weaknesses from the FY 2020 audit and would 
indirectly support the correction of five more weaknesses related to control processes.  
D. REVISE DFAS RESPONSIBILITIES 
The author recommends DOD leadership consider revising the language in DOD 
Directive 5118.05 regarding DFAS responsibilities. The existing language is broad enough 
to place all DOD financial and accounting requirements under the purview of DFAS. 
DFAS is not equipped to address such a scope of work regarding auditability, and as a 
result must pass on recommendations and corrective action plans to other organizations. 
The other DOD components turn back to DFAS as the financial service provider when 
seeking to address those findings, which creates confusion and a lack of clearly defined 
responsibility. Without the funding, manpower, and resources to adequately address 
material weaknesses, DFAS has focused on short term solutions to fix what they can. This 
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has extended the timeline for DOD auditability and increased associated costs. Clearly 
defined DFAS responsibilities related to auditability would allow more effective 
accountability and focus for corrective action. This could be accomplished by either 
narrowing the scope of DODD 5118.05 to a role that DFAS can successfully accomplish, 
or by expanding the resources, manpower, and authority of DFAS. Without a delineation 
of responsibility between DFAS and the other components, the DOD cannot efficiently 
achieve long term auditability and reduce financial management costs. This 
recommendation addresses one FY 2020 material weakness specific to management and 






This thesis investigated the results of the FY 2020 DOD-wide audit to identify 
patterns and underlying causes of material weaknesses. The author researched historical 
GAO and IG reports, the results of the annual external audit, and studies on the 
effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on civilian organizations. Based on the findings 
of that research, the author concluded that consistent patterns do exist in DFAS control 
procedures and monitoring activities that contributed to material weaknesses. Furthermore, 
the author found that ineffective financial systems in the DOD were the root cause of most 
FY 2020 audit material weaknesses. Analysis of the findings provided four policy 
recommendations for DOD and DFAS leadership to consider, which addressed control 
procedures, monitoring activities, financial systems, and the definition of DFAS 
responsibilities. The author concluded that these four areas contributed to a significant 
amount of FY 2020 material weaknesses and NFRs, and that existing corrective action 
plans were not sufficient for achieving auditability. One limitation in the research was a 
lack of quantitative cost-benefit analysis for ERP system deployment, which is a 
recommended area for future study. DFAS and DOD leadership have made substantial 
progress towards auditability, as reflected in the improvements between the FY 2019 and 
FY 2020 audits. However, the analysis of research conducted in this thesis indicated that 
the DOD will not achieve a clean audit opinion without addressing these findings. 
Implementing all four recommendations may not be possible in a budget constrained 
environment, but they provide a starting point for leadership to consider and provide insight 
on underlying patterns and weaknesses impacting auditability efforts.  
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APPENDIX A. SOX BEST PRACTICES 
The 2020 Protiviti survey of Sarbanes-Oxley compliant companies generated a list 
of lessons learned and best practices which could apply to DFAS and DOD internal 
controls, listed in Table 3 (Protiviti, 2020). 
Table 3. Sarbanes-Oxley Best Practices. Adapted from Protiviti (2020). 
Internal Control Short-Term Practice Long-Term Solution 
Manual Journal Entry 
Review 
Employ digital signatures 
within PDF software to 
review documents. 
Utilize ERP workflow 
tools to increase 
automation for account 
reconciliation and other 
accounting processes. 
Period-End Journal Review Use PDF software to sign 
and document the review 
of journal reports in audit 
programs.  
Use modern software such 
as Microsoft Teams to 
record task completion. 
Rank transactions by risk 
factors to focus on high-
risk areas. 
Account Reconciliation Focus efforts to determine 
low-risk and high-risk 
accounts. Validate email 
submissions and utilize 
shared folders with 
restricted access for 
review. 
Use automated 
reconciliation software to 
minimize the risk of 
manual error. Rank 
accounts by risk to focus 
on high-risk areas.  
Period-End Checklists Use online signature tools 
to document the review 
and approval of checklists.  
Use software such as 
Microsoft Teams to 
collaborate and record task 
completion. Use ERP 
workflow tools to structure 
progression and allow 
monitoring.  
Employee Change Notices Use a centralized email 
box. Use signature tools to 
document review and 
approval.  
Use IT incident 
management tools to 
document approval.  
Physical Inventory 
Validation 
Use third parties to certify 
inventory counts.  
Use automated scanning 
technology to validate 
inventory.  
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Internal Control Short-Term Practice Long-Term Solution 
User Access Review Run reports on exact 
period-end dates.  
Program software to 
automatically run reports 
on predetermined dates.  
Dual Signature 
Requirements 
Have central transactional 
authority review and 
double sign high risk 
transactions.  
Employ modern banking 
software tools for 
transaction verification.  
Manual Approval of 
Invoices 
Use PDF software to 
document signatures.  
Use ERP workflow tools to 




APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL IG REPORT DATA 
The Inspector General conducted multiple investigations into improper payments 
between 2015 and 2021. The findings of the investigations not discussed in the body of the 
thesis were:  
• January 2015: DFAS methodologies did not capture improper payment 
estimates or fully disclose overpayments. Weaknesses in control activities 
limited the ability to identify, assess, and correct improper payments (IG, 
2015b).  
• May 2015: DFAS provided unreliable improper payment estimates and 
did not conduct adequate quality assurance review (IG, 2015c).  
• March 2016: DOD component actions did not adequately reduce improper 
payments in the DOD Travel Pay program (IG, 2016a).  
• May 2016: The DOD did not provide reliable improper payment estimates 
or achieve reduction targets outlined in the FY 2015 Improper Payments 
Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) (IG, 2016b). The IG 
recommendation to determine the source of obligations not reviewed for 
improper payments remains open (IG, 2020c).  
• May 2017: The DOD did not comply with five of six IPERA requirements 
including publishing the AFR on time, conducting risk assessment, 
publishing relevant improper payment estimates, including planned 
completion dates for corrective action plans, or meeting reduction targets 
for two of nine programs (IG, 2017a). The IG recommendations to verify 
risk assessment procedures and outline corrective action plans remain 
open (IG, 2020c).  
• May 2018: The DOD did not comply with four of six IPERA requirements 
including publishing all required information in the AFR, reporting 
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statistically valid improper payment estimates, publishing required 
elements of corrective action plans, or meeting reduction targets for four 
programs (IG, 2018a). The IG recommendations to develop statistically 
relevant sampling plans for testing improper payments remain open (IG, 
2020c).  
• May 2019: The DOD did not comply with three of six IPERA 
requirements including publishing reliable improper payment estimates, 
publishing required elements of corrective action plans, and meeting 
improper payment reduction targets (IG, 2019a). Ten IG recommendations 
regarding documentation, auditing, improper payment reporting, 
corrective action plans, procedure development, sampling processes, and 
establishing a review process remain open (IG, 2020c).  
• May 2020: The DOD did not comply with two of six IPERA requirements 
including publishing reliable improper payment estimates and meeting 
annual reduction targets for three programs (IG, 2020b).  
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